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Abstrat
This paper investigates the impat of British maroeonomi and monetary
news on English interest rates level and volatility. These news orrespond to
Bank of England (BoE) target variables news and to unexpeted monetary pol-
iy rate hanges. It analyzes whether the market rate response to these news
has hanged sine the Bank of England (BoE) was granted operational inde-
pendene in May 1997. It also heks if this redibility measure has inreased
the preditability of BoE deisions by the market. The results reveal that after
May 1997, nanial markets appears better able to antiipe BoE poliy dei-
sions than before May 1997. However, Bank of England target variable news
announements and poliy rate hanges diusion inuene more English inter-
est rate volatility after May 1997. This results suggests that the redibility
and/or transpareny of BoE might have dereased after 1997. However, the
loser evolution of the realized ination around the target xed by the BoE and
the evolution of the transpareny and redibility index suggest that the BoE
transpareny and redibility degree inrease sine 1997 ompare to the period
prior to 1997. One possible explanation of this last results rests on unertainty
reated by the several nanial rises (the Asian risis (July 1997), the Russian
risis (August 1998), the bursting of the tehnology and internet bubble in 2002
in USA).
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1 Introdution
Aside from its negative eet on the ondution of monetary poliy by the en-
tral bank
1
, high interest rate volatility blurs the prevision of the monetary poliy
stane by nanial market partiipants. In order to provide a stable environment for
nanial market whih failitates to reah its target, entral banks seek to redue in-
terest rates variability (Goodfriend, 1990; Froyen and Waud, 1995; Goodhard, 1996;
Woodford, 1999)
2 ,3
. Indeed, it is easier for poliy makers to redue unertainty
that they reate themselves rather than unertainty due to other fators. To re-
due nanial instability and variabilities of their variables objetives, entral banks
started to ommuniate more information about the ondut of their poliy and to
enfore their redibility (Faust and Svensson,2001; Dodge, 2002; Longworth, 2002).
Greater redibility of entral bank helps to redue nanial speulation and redue
the heterogeneity of market operators expetations about future monetary authori-
ties deisions and future evolution of the objetive variables. These onsequenes of a
greater redibility should enhane the preditability of the entral bank rate hanges.
In addition, a greater redibility should redue the unertainty related to monetary
poliy and then redue the eets of news related to monetary poliy on nanial
market volatility.
Several authors argue that nanial market volatility reets unertainty about
monetary poliy stane. Most of these researhers have foused on the role of maroe-
onomi news announements, related to monetary poliy, as a soure of nanial
market volatility and partiularly interest rates market (Fleming and Remolona,
1997; Jones et al.,1998; Lee, 2002). A large part of these authors suppose onstant
nanial market response to news. However, market interest rate reation to these
news strongly depends on entral bank transpareny and redibility degrees (Hal-
dane and Read, 1999, 2000; Ellingsen and Söderström, 2001; Gravelle and Moessner,
1
Interest rates instability inuenes the eonomi situation and the entral bank target variables
and then importunes the monetary poliy ondut.
2
The job of entral bankers is to ondut monetary poliy in order to promote prie stability,
sustainable growth, and a stable nanial system.
3
There have been a number of papers doumenting and analysing so-alled "interest rate smooth-
ing" (Goodhart, 1996 and Woodford, 1999). See Sak and Wieland (2000) for a literature reviews.
Although the primary fous of that literature is the observed tendeny for the smoothing of poliy
rates, part of the motivation for suh behavior has been to provide a stable environment for nanial
markets.
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2001; Parent, 2003; Connoly and Kohler, 2004; Tuysuz, 2006, 2007). Thus, a greater
transpareny or redibility should aet interest rate reation.
An inreasing number of aademi papers analyze the eets of a greater trans-
pareny or redibility on nanial market. Most of these papers have foused on
the theoretial and empirial aspets of monetary poliy transpareny. These studies
mainly onsider the eets of a greater transpareny on the reation of interest rate
levels to maroeonomi and monetary news related to the monetary poliy and on
the preditability of entral bank deisions (Haldane and Read, 2000; Kuttner, 2001;
Poole et al., 2002; Lange et al., 2003; Poole and Rashe, 2003; Parent, 2003; Swans-
son, 2004). Conerning the eets on the volatility, only Nolan and Chadha (2001),
Clare and Courtenay (2001a,b) and Tuysuz (2007) examine the eets of a greater
transpareny on the impat of these news on nanial market volatility.
In ontrast with the previous studies, the number of aademi papers on the
eets of a greater redibility is more less than this on the eet of a greater trans-
pareny. Several authors analyze the eets of redibility on the overall output.
There is general agreement that independent, transparent, aountable, and redible
entral banks are able to deliver better overall poliy outomes (Alesina, 1988; Grilli,
Masiandaro, and Tabellini, 1991; Cukierman, 1992; Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti,
1992; Alesina and Summers, 1993; Jonsson, 1995; Loungani and Sheets, 1997; Ei-
jnger et al., 1998). As for the eets on nanial market, authors as Alesina and
Summers (1993) show that higher entral bank independene may be assoiated with
lower interest rate variability, suggesting that more redible regimes enjoy less vari-
able interest rates. And onerning the eets of a greater redibility on nanial
market reation to news, it was analyse only by Chadha and Nolan (2001) and Clare
and Courtenay (2001a,b). However, Clare and Courtenay onsider the exhange rate
and the futures ontrats. And Chadha and Nolan (2001) do not take the main
maroeonomi news related to Bank of England.
While nanial market volatility reets unertainty about monetary poliy stane
(Jones et al., 1998; Lee, 2002)), the objetive of this paper is to explore the eet of
a greater entral bank redibility on interest rate level and volatility response to its
fundamental related to the monetary poliy. More preisely, this paper investigates
whether the British interest rates level and volatility response to English maroeo-
nomi and monetary news has hanged sine the Bank of England (BoE) was granted
operational independene in May 1997. In addition, it also analyses the impat of
3
the adoption of instrument independene by the BoE on the ability of nanial mar-
kets predition about this Bank deisions. For the present analysis, two kinds of
daily interest rate series (3, 6 and 12 months rates and 3, 5, 7 and 10 years rate)
and several maroeonomi news related to BoE target variables were used. Maroe-
onomi news inlude BoE target variables and the oial interest rate deisions
about English monetary poliy. All these data over the period ranging from the
rst of January 1994 to 28 February 2003. Interest rate dynamis are evaluated with
a GARCH (1,1) approah, proposed by Bollerslev (1986). To take into aount the
impat of the new redibility measure, interest rates dynamis are evaluated for the
sub-periods preeding and following May 1997. Suh an approah per sub-periods
was used by the majority of the authors analyzing the impat of monetary poliy
rate hanges on rates dynamis by taking into aount new measurements of trans-
pareny and/or redibility (see for example Urih and Wahtel, 2001; Chadha and
Nolan, 2001; Clare and Courtenay, 2001; Lee, 2002; Parent, 2003).
The paper proeeds as follows. Setion 2 presents how a new redibility measure
inuenes the response of the interest rate level and volatility to entral bank target
variables news and to monetary poliy deisions. It also put in evidene that a greater
redibility improve the ability of nanial markets to antiipate entral bank deision.
Setion 3 presents the data used for the analysis. In setion 4, the examination of
the data suggests that the ability of nanial markets to antiipate Bank of England
deisions hanges improved after 1997. Setion 5 presents the model used to evaluate
the response of interest rate level and volatility to maroeonomi and monetary news
(model GARCH). Setion 6 analyzes the results, and nally, setion 7 onludes.
2 How a greater redibility an aet interest rate re-
sponse to news?
Market operators reation to entral bank target variables news depends mainly on
how this agents understand the eetive ondut of the monetary poliy and how
they aknowledge the apaity of the entral bank (Haldane and Read, 1999, 2000;
Ellingsen and Söderström, 2001; Gravelle and Moessner, 2001; Parent, 2003; Connoly
and Kohler, 2004). In another way, market interest rate level and volatility response
to entral bank target variables news and to monetary poliy rate hanges depends
4
strongly on the entral bank transpareny and redibility. Consequently, a greater
redibility should aet the interest rates level and volatility response to maroeo-
nomi news announements and to the unexpeted part of the monetary poliy rate
hanges. In addition, this measure should also aet the market preditability of the
entral bank monetary poliy deisions. These eets of a new redibility measure
are presented in what follows.
2.1 Impats on interest rates response to entral bank target vari-
ables news
Aording to Geraats (2000, 2002), Jensen (2001) and Clare and Courtenay (2001a,
b), a new redibility measure should improve the entral bank transpareny degree
4
.
More preisely, Jensen shows theoretially that a entral bank whih manages to
maintain the ination rate lose to its target an be optimally transparent. In an-
other way, Jensen nd that fully redible entral bank is also optimally transparent.
As for Geraats, she argues that a greater redibility improves entral bank politial
transpareny
5
and then the general transpareny. Indeed, politial transpareny is
enhaned by institutional arrangements, like entral bank independene and entral
bank ontrats; beause they ensure that there is no undue inuene or politial pres-
sure to deviate from stated objetives. In another world, entral bank independene
and entral bank ontrats inrease market operators aknowledge the apaity of
4
Many theoretial and empirial works show that monetary poliy transpareny has the potential
to enhane the redibility, reputation and exibility of entral banks (Saxton, 1997; Geraats, 2000;
Faust and Svensson, 2001; Cukierman, 2001; Geraats et al., 2006). However, the inuene of the
redibility on the transpareny was onsidered only by authors, as Geraats (2000, 2002), Jensen
(2001) and Clare and Courtenay (2001a, b).
5
Geraats distinguish ve aspets of transpareny : politial, eonomi, proedural, poliy and op-
erational transpareny. Politial transpareny refers to openness about poliy objetives. Eonomi
transpareny fouses on the eonomi information that is used for monetary poliy. This inludes
the eonomi data the entral bank uses, the poliy models it employs to onstrut eonomi fore-
asts or evaluate the impat of its deisions, and the internal foreasts the entral bank relies on.
Proedural transpareny is about the way monetary poliy deisions are taken. Poliy transpareny
means a prompt announement of poliy deisions. In addition, it inludes an explanation of the de-
ision and a poliy inlination or indiation of likely future poliy ations. Operational transpareny
onerns the implementation of the entral bank's poliy ations. In the same way that Geraats,
another authors as Gerbash and Hahn (2000) and Faust and Svensson (2000) dene dierent types
of transpareny.
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entral bank to fulll its objetives, thus to maintain the ination rate lose to its
target. Consequently, market operators expetation about future ination will be
less heterogeneous and loser to the level xed by the entral bank. Thus, entral
bank independene or entral bank ontrats should imply a redution of unertainty
related to the monetary poliy and a derease the heterogeneity of the investors' ex-
petations about the future orientation of the monetary poliy and about the future
evolution of the target variables. These eets expressed itself by a smaller inter-
est rates volatility reation to entral bank target variables news and by a greater
response of these rates level to these news.
Empirially, several authors, as Alesina (1988), Grilli, Masiandaro, and Tabellini
(1991), Cukierman (1992), Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti (1992), and Alesina and
Summers (1993), Jonsson (1995), Loungani and Sheets (1997) and Eijnger et al.
(1998), among other, nd evidene of a negative orrelation of entral bank inde-
pendene with lower and more stable ination. Conerning the eets on nanial
markets, Alesina and Summers (1993), using ross setion evidene, show that inter-
est rate variability is dereasing with higher entral bank independene, suggesting
that more redible entral banks benet from less variable interest rates. As for the
relation between the redibility and the response of nanial markets to news, it was
taken into aount only by Clare and Courtenay (2001a, 2001b) and Chadha and
Nolan (2001). Clare and Courtenay investigate whether the reation of British fu-
tures ontrats and exhanges rates to English maroeonomi news announements
has hanged sine the Bank of England was granted operational independene in May
1997. Their results indiate that there may well have been hanges in the way that
nanial markets inorporate key eonomi data into seurities pries. In partiular,
they doument an inrease in the speed of the reation to interest rate announe-
ments. As for Chadha and Nolan (2001), they analyse the impats of numerous
hange in English monetary poliy ondut, and partiularly the independene of the
Bank of England, on short-term interest rate volatility reation to announement of
the Bank of England interest rate deisions, of publiations of the minutes of the
Monetary Poliy Committee (MPC) meetings and of the publiations of the quar-
terly Ination Report. However, Clare and Courtenay analyze only the dynamis
of the future ontrats and the exhange rate, and Chadha and Nolan onsider few
explanatory variables.
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2.2 Impats on the interest rates response to entral bank deisions
A greater redibility and then a better market understanding of monetary poliy
should improve the auray of market foreasts of entral bank poliy deisions.
A number of researhers have foused on the role of a new transpareny measure
on the ability of nanial markets to predit monetary poliy deisions (Tabellini,
1987; Dotsey, 1987; Rudin, 1988; Blinder, 1998; Kuttner, 2001; Haldane and Read,
2000; Poole et al., 2002; Lange et al., 2003; Poole and Rashe, 2003; Swansson, 2004;
Tuysuz, 2006, 2007). For the United States, Poole and Rashe (2003), Urih and
Wahtel (2001), Lange et al. (2003), Swansson (2004) and Tuysuz (2007) demon-
strated that preditability of the Fed's ations inreased after the 1994 deision to
announe hanges in Fed poliy rates immediately after Federal Open Market Com-
mittee (FOMC) meetings. However, the impat of a new redibility on the degree of
foresees ability was not retained in the empirial studies.
The less unertain and the better preditability of entral bank deisions should
redue interest rates response to monetary poliy deisions. Aording to Kuttner
(2001), only the unexpeted part of the entral bank deisions provide news infor-
mations about monetary poliy to markets operators' and then inuene interest
rates dynami. In addition, a greater redibility should redue investors' expeta-
tions about ination and thereby derease also interest rates response to monetary
poliy deisions. Indeed aording to Fisher (1930) hypothesis nominal interest rate
is expressed as the sum of expeted onstant real interest rates plus expeted rate
of ination. On the other hand, in situation of fully redibility, the derease of the
poliy rate, for example, will not generate a rise of interest rates. The inrease in
the degree of redibility thus redues the impat of monetary poliy rate hanges
on interest rates level. Empirially, several authors analyse the impat of a greater
transpareny on nanial markets reation to monetary poliy ations (Urih and
Wahtel, 2001; Kuttner, 2001; Coppel and Connolly, 2003)
6
. However, the impat
of a greater redibility on the nanial market reation to entral bank ations was
retained only by Chadha and Nolan (2001) and Clare and Courtenay (2001).
On the volatility level, a new redibility measure inuenes interest rates volatility
6
For example, Haldane and Read (2001) found that the introdution of ination targeting in
the United Kingdom appears to have oinided with a marked dampening in yield urve responses,
suggesting greater transpareny and preditability as the Bank of England monetary framework
hanged.
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response to entral bank deisions diusion (Chadha and Nolan, 2001; Clare and
Courtenay, 2001a,b; Lee, 2002). Indeed, unertainty related to monetary poliy and
heterogeneity of investors antiipations depend negatively on entral bank redibility
degree.
3 Data Desription and Preliminary Tests
This setion presents the dataset and its statistial properties. The empirial part
uses data series on interest rates, maroeonomi announements and unexpeted
variations of key interest rates.
3.1 Interest rates series
Two kinds of daily interest rate series are onsidered: a short term rate (London
Interbank Oered Rates; LIBOR) and a Government bond rate orresponding to
maturities of respetively 3, 6 and 12 months and 3, 5, 7 and 10 years. These series
over the period ranging from the rst of January 1994 to February, 28th, 2003. This
data orresponds to the quotes at loal time market losure: 17:30 AM GMT.
In order to determine the order of integration of these series we arry out a
series of unit-root tests. Three dierent kinds of unit-root tests are performed: the
standard ADF test, the Zivot and Andrews (1992) test and nally the Seo (1999)
test. Aording to the results of the ADF test, displayed in table 6, we annot rejet
the null hypothesis of unit root for any of the four series. These results are onrmed
for the Zivot and Andrews test as well as the Seo test. The Seo statisti allows to
take into aount for strutural hanges in the series while the former aounts for the
presene of onditional heteroskedastiity. Indeed, using Box-Piere, Ljung-Box and
LM statistis (see table 7), the null hypothesis of homoskedastiity is rejeted at the
5% level for all assets onsidered in our study. Thus, all interest rate series present a
unit root and interest rates dierentials will be used in the empirial analysis. These
interest rate series are also onditionally heterosedasti.
3.2 Announements and surprises
Aording to Balduzzi et al. (1997), it is not the announement per se that is im-
portant, but rather the information it onveys to market partiipants. Indeed, if
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announements only omfort agents in their expetations they will not indue any
behavioral hanges. Sine the aim of this paper is to study the eet of announe-
ments on the dynamis of interest rates, series that reet unantiipated variations
for the relevant series are needed. These "surprises" are dened as the dierene
between the observed values for the variables and the values that were antiipated.
As antiipations annot be observed diretly some approximation are needed. The
surveys published by Reuters for UK maroeonomi announements are used in this
paper. This organization ollets every Friday foreasts from a panel of market par-
tiipants for the following week announements. Median values for eah variable were
omputed. Those values were retained as proxies of market partiipant expetations.
In more detail, these variables orrespond to possible targets for entral banks.
That is, primarily, news onerning the ination rate and the global health of the
eonomies onsidered. The onsidered announements onern unemployment (UE),
Consumer Prie Index (CPI), Prodution Prie Index (PPI), Prodution index (PROD),
retail sales (RET) and the aggregate M4 (M4). All these maroeonomi and mone-
tary news are announed around 9:30 a.m..
Conerning the unexpeted part of monetary poliy deisions, two methods have
been used in the literature for their omputation. The rst method uses surveys
as previously disussed for maroeonomi announements. The alternative is to
approximate entral banks deisions through some arefully hosen assets quotations.
This solution was preferred to the use of surveys sine, as pointed by Ehrmann and
Fratzher (2003), (2005), the weekly frequeny of those surveys prevent from taking
into aount the most reent expetations. On the other side, the assets pries used
are those from the day preeding entral bankers deisions. The nanial assets
allowing this deomposition must show some harateristis (Brooke et al., 2000),
namely (i) its maturity is lose to that of the key interest rate, (ii) it is a liquid asset
and (iii) its maturity is shorter that the time interval between two monetary poliy
meetings. In the ase of United Kingdom, assets that an be used to extrat the
unexpeted part of English monetary authorities deisions orrespond to the short
term forward rates dedued from the two alternative forward urves estimate by the
BoE
7
(Ross, 2002). However, the both short term forward rates are available only
7
BoE estimates two alternative forward urves from two alternatives sets of instruments. One
urve is tted using mostly GC repos and gilt yields (known generially as the VRP urve), while
9
Table 1: Perentage of expeted and unexpeted BoE' rate hanges
January 1994 - May 1997 May 1997 - February 2003
Atual Change
- Expeted No Change 77.78% 44.00%
- Expeted Change 22.22% 56.00%
Atual No Change
- Expeted Change 3.03% 1.89%
- Expeted No Change 96.97% 98.11%
Total
- Inorret expetation 19.05% 15.38%
- Corret expetation 80.95% 84.62%
from 1997. Our period of study starts in January 1994. We thus relied on the Reuters
poll for this ountry, although this means that the agents expetations are only known
on a weekly frequeny. As shown in, e.g., Gravelle and Moessner (2001) or Ehrmann
and Fratzher (2005), survey expetations prove to be unbiased and eient.
The expeted and unexpeted part of the poliy monetary rate an serve to assess
and disuss the preditability of BoE deisions.
4 Eets of a greater redibility on the preditability of
the Bank of England poliy deisions
In order to hek if the Bank of England independene improves the preditability
of its deisions, the perentages of the expeted and unexpeted part of the BoE
poliy deisions for the sub-periods preeding and following May 1997 are determined.
Aording to the table 1, after the adoption of instrument independene of the BoE
in 1997, the nanial markets appear better able to antiipe BoE poliy deisions
than before may 1997. Indeed, only 80.95% monetary poliy deisions were antiiped
before mai 1997 and 84.62% of deisions are antiiped after this date. These results
reveal that market operators better understand the eetive ondut of the monetary
poliy and/or they aknowledge the apaity of the entral bank after may 1997 than
the seond (known as the bank liability urve) is tted using syntheti bond pries from interbank
oer rates, short-sterling futures, FRAs, and swaps. After adjusting for biases, these urves an be
seen as the best measure of the market's expetation of two-week forward rates.
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before this date.
In addition, the adoption of instrument independene of the Bank of England in
May 1997 should aet interest rates mean and volatility response to eonomi and
monetary news. This impat is analyse in the following setions.
5 Empirial model
Giving the unit-root test in Setion 2, interest rates rst-dierened response to
maroeonomi and poliy news has been modelised as follows:
∆Rt = a+ b∆Rt−1 + c∆r
∗
τ +
K∑
k=1
dkD
a
k,t +
3∑
j=1
ejJSt + ǫt, (1)
where Rt denotes interest rates dierentials in period t. ∆r
∗
τ and D
a
k,t, k = 1, . . . ,K
orrespond respetively to the unexpeted part of the monetary poliy rate hanges
and a set of British maroeonomi news. c and dk measure these news eets
on interest rate level. The index τ is used for the maroeonomis announements
variables instead of t. Depending on the variable, τ will be equal to t or t − 1. All
maroeonomi and monetary variables retained in this paper are announed around
9:30 a.m. (loal time) and BoE deisions are diused around 12:00 a.m. Thus,
Government bond rates in period t respond to maroeonomi news and monetary
poliy deisions announed the same day (period t). In the same way, LIBOR's rates
in the period t reat to maroeonomi news announed the same day. In ontrast,
monetary poliy deisions diused in period t− 1 aet short term rate in period t.
In addition to maroeonomi and poliy news, three days of the week are take into
aount; namely Monday (Mo), Wednesday (We) and Friday (Fr).
The term ǫt orresponds to the innovation series. Several authors estimate equa-
tion (1) supposing that the innovations are a Gaussian white noise (Balduzzi et al.,
1999; Bernhardsen, 2000; Ellingsen and Söderström, 2001; Favero, 2001; Kearney,
2001; Caporale and Williams, 2002; Parent, 2003). In the same line, equation (1)
was estimated, rst by supposing that the innovations are a Gaussian white noise
and Engle Arh LM statistis was then applied to hek whether the innovations ǫt
are onditionally homosedasti. Table 8, in the Appendix, enables to rejet the null
hypothesis and then aept the hypothesis that the interest rates volatility is on-
ditionally heterosedasti. Sine Bollerslev proposed the GARCH models in 1986,
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numerous authors used suh model to take into aount the persistene in ondi-
tional varianes of nanial market. As these authors, we also apply the GARCH
approah of Bollerslev to estimate the onditional varianes of the interest rates. This
model an be expressed as:
ht = w + αε
2
t−1 + βht−1 + γDumr∗τ +
K∑
k=1
θkDum
a
k,t +
3∑
j=1
λjJSt. (2)
As in the mean equation (Eq. 1), the inuene of maroeonomi and poliy vari-
ables are taking into aount. Contrary to the mean equation, dummies instead of
atual news in order to avoid multiollinearity with the onditional mean regressors
are used. More preisely, Dumr∗τ is equal to 1 during entral bank deisions an-
nounement days. In the same way, eah dummy variable Dumak,t, for k = 1, ...,K,
is equal to 1 during the announement days of the variable k.
6 Empirial results
In order to take into aount the impat of the adoption of instrument independene
of the BoE, interest rates dynamis have been estimated as desribed by equations
(1) and (2) for the sub-periods preeding and following May 1997
8
. The results are
presented and disussed in what follows.
6.1 Interest rate reation to maroeonomi and monetary news
Over the period former to the BoE independene, interest rates level reat parti-
ularly to the unemployment, produer prie index and retail sales news (see Table
1). On the seond sub-period, it is interesting to note that unemployment and pro-
duer prie index news have lost all the impat they had before 1997. During this
period, market interest rates reat mainly to prodution and retail sales news. Un-
employment news inuene negatively interest rates dynami whereas retail sales and
8
Suh an approah per under-period was used by the majority of the authors analyzing the
impat of the monetary poliy rate hanges on the dynamis of interest rates by taking aount of
new measurements of transpareny and/or redibility of the entral bank (Urih and Wahtel, 2001;
Lee, 2002; Tuysuz, 2007). It was also used by Parent (2003), who studies the impat of the shoks
of the variables relating to the Canadian monetary poliy on the level of the rates of the market.
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produer prie index have positive impat on interest rates level. The sign of these
impats is in aordane with theoretial expetanies. For instane, the negative ef-
fet of unemployment news an be explained if market operators trust the monetary
poliies about their apaity to ontrol inationary shoks. In other words, they have
enough ondene in entral bank to ahieve its employment target by reduing in-
terest rates without imperiling their ination objetive. As for produer prie index,
it an serve as a proxy for the ination level. Thus, a positive surprise orresponds
to an underestimation of the ination level and market investors will revise their
expetations about BoE monetary poliy rate. Lastly, the retail sales an be used
as a omponent of the eonomi ativity. Most theories predit that an unexpeted
inreases in real ativity and ination should inrease bond rates (Hess,2001; An-
dersen, Bollerslev, Diebold and Vega, 2004). More preisely, if inreasing eonomi
ativity is oupled with inreasing investments, and thus with a higher demand for
apital, interest rates should rise given a nite elastiity of apital supply. Informa-
tion about higher eonomi ativity might also alter agents' expetations of future
ination rates, sine ination ould be spurred by an overheating eonomy. Thus, an
unexpeted inrease in retail sales then in real ativity ould drive interest rates up
through higher real rates and/or higher ination expetations.
As for the BoE poliy rate, in eah sub-period the unexpeted part of monetary
poliy deisions inuene positively interest rates and the amplitude of this eet
is dereasing with maturity (see Table 2) (c). This positive eet has already been
shows by empirial studies suh as Cook and Hahn (1989), Kuttner (2001), Kim and
Sheen (2000) or Lee (2002). This observation supports the expetations theory of
the term struture
9
. In addition, table 2 point out an important inrease in interest
rate reation to unexpeted poliy deisions after 1997. Indeed, the unexpeted poliy
deisions inuene only the 3-years and 5-years interest rates before 1997. In ontrast,
after 1997, short term and medium term interest rates reat to poliy deisions. In
addition, the overall size of interest rate response to unexpeted hanges in the BoE
rate tends to inrease after 1997. To illustrate this eet, the 12-month interest rate
reation to unexpeted poliy deisions was 0.084 before 1997 whereas this reation
inreases down to 0.4478 after 1997.
9
The expetations theory says that a long term interest rate should be equal to the average of
the short term interest rates over the same period of time plus a term premium; thus, an inrease
in the rst ouple of short rate should drive up the long rate in a lesser extent.
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It appears that agents are more sensitive to eonomi growth and unemployment
hoks during the both sub-periods. During the rst sub-period, there was greater
unertainty onerning unemployment and eonomi growth than there was about
ination. The period prior to 1997 was marked by a relatively low English ination
rate (see g. 1 in appendix). This rate osillated around 2%. Contrary, the un-
employment rate was important (see g. 2 in appendix). During this period, the
BoE inreased more their main interest rate that dereased them. These deisions of
the British monetary authorities allowed to maintain the ination rate lose to her
target but they aeted negatively the eonomi growth and unemployment. These
observations an explain the greater unertainty onerning the unemployment and
the eonomi situation prior to 1997. After 1997, market operator's sensitivity to un-
employment disappeared. During this seond period, these agents seemed to be more
sensitive to eonomi growth hoks. As for the rst sub-period, our results an be
explained by the greater unertainty onerning the eonomi growth than there was
about unemployment rate and ination rate. These both rates were relatively low
after 1997. However, this period was marked by an important derease and inrease
of the gross domesti produt rate (see Fig. 3 in appendix). These observations
an explain the sensitivity of nanial agents to eonomi growth hoks during the
seond period.
Finally, the last observation onerns the dynami of interest rate volatility. Table
5 shows that Wald test enables to rejet the null hypothesis of integrated GARCH
model (IGARCH). However, the sum of the GARCH oeients (α+β) is quite high.
In another world, the importane of the sum of the GARCH oeients suggests
quite important autoorrelated interest rate volatility. However, this event ould not
be explained by unertainty related to the BoE monetary poliy. Indeed, during
the both sub-periods, maroeonomi and monetary variables announements do not
have important impat on interest rates volatility. These results are in aordane
with results obtained by Jones et al. (1998). These authors nd that the impat
of maroeonomi announements on interest rate volatility does not persist at all,
onsistent with the immediate inorporation of information's into pries. Aording
to these authors, maroeonomi announement days do not explain Government
bond rate persistene.
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6.2 Transpareny and redibility of the Bank of England - disus-
sion
The result that the eets of maroeonomi news announements on interest rate
volatility inrease in the seond sub-period suggests that BoE redibility and/or
transpareny derease sine May 1997. The greater impat of BoE deisions an-
nounements on market rate level and volatility after 1997 suggests also the derease
of BoE redibility and/or transpareny degree. Indeed, aording to setion 2, in
the period following the implementation of a new redibility measure, interest rate
volatility should be less inuened by the announements on maroeonomi and
monetary variables (Chadha and Nolan, 2001; Clare and Courtenay, 2001a,b; Tuy-
suz, 2007). Similarly, a greater redibility should imply a derease of interest rate
level reation to unexpeted monetary poliy rate hanges.
A smaller redibility means that BoE does not manage to respet ination sta-
bility around its target. However, British ination rate evolution after May 1997,
represented in gure 1 in the appendix, does not emphasize any inationary ten-
deny during the seond sub-period. This observation suggests, then, that whih an
all into question the BoE redibility. In addition, using Cukierman and Meltzer
(1986)
10 ,11
methodology, we onstrut BoE redibility degree from 1994 to 2003. Ta-
ble 2 shows that BoE redibility degree inrease over time. These both observations
suggest that the BoE redibility degree has not derease sine 1997.
Table 2: BoE redibility and transpareny degree evolution (1994-2003)
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Credibility
degree
1 0,99 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Transpareny
degree
0,73 0,80 0,80 0,80 0,80 0,80
The index of redibility (resp. transpareny) takes a value between 0 and 1.
The index of redibility (transpareny) takes a value of 1 if entral bank is fully redible (transparent).
The index of redibility (transpareny) takes a value of 0 if entral bank is not redible (transparent).
10
In the literature, the most frequently used methodology to onstrut redibility index is the
methodology proposed by Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) (Faust and Svensson, 1998; Huthison
and Walsh, 1998; Cehetti and Krause, 2002).
11
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) methodology is presented in appendix.
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The stronger eets of maroeonomi and monetary news announement days
on the interest rates volatility ould also be explained by a derease of the BoE
transpareny degree. However, after May 1997, Bank of English is amongst the most
transparent entral bank (Chadha and Nolan, 2001; Clare and Courtenay, 2001;
Diner and Eihengreen, 2007). Indeed, sine 1997 the nal objetive of monetary
poliy has been made expliit and passed to an independent entral bank, the date
of the Monetary Poliy Committee meetings are known around a year in advane,
the deision of the BoE is announed at a set time, often with an explanation for
the deision, minutes detailing voting patterns are published and regular quarterly
foreasts of the intermediate variable under a variety of assumptions are published.
In partiular, it makes known the voting reord of the nine members of the Monetary
Poliy Committee (MPC), along with a detailed summary/ommentary of the MPC's
deliberations. In addition, aording to Diner and Eihengreen (2007)
12
, the Bank
of England transpareny degree was about 73% in 1998 and 88% between 1999 and
2005 (table 2). In sum, these both observations suggest that the greater eets of
maroeonomi and monetary news on market volatility annot be explained by the
degree of transpareny.
In aordane with Chadha and Nolan (2001)
13
observations, the arguments pre-
sented in the both previous paragraph suggest that the stronger eets of British
maroeonomi and monetary news announements on interest rates volatility ould
not be explained neither by a derease of BoE redibility nor by a derease of BoE
transpareny. A possible explanation of the ampliation of the poliy deision im-
12
Several authors onstrut entral bank transpareny index (Fry et al., 2000; Mahadeva and
Sterne, 2000; Bini-Smaghi and Gros, 2001; Siklos, 2002; De Haan, Amtembrink and Waller (2004),
Eijnger and Geraats, 2006; Diner and Eihengreen, 2007). Among these authors, Diner and
Eihengreen onstrut a transpareny index for a large number of ountry (124) and for a long
period (from 1998 to 2005). For this reason, we use their transpareny index.
13
Chadha and Nolan (2001) nd that the British market interest rate volatility higher after May
1997. These authors argue that the highest level of interest rate volatility has been assoiated
with the period of ination targeting following the adoption of entral bank independene (May
1997). These authors examine whether this volatility is attributed to the information ows related
to British monetary poliy. Their results suggests that information ows in the form of minutes of
poliy meetings, published ination foreasts and announements of the Bank of England interest
rates deisions, show little sign of aeting, jointly or individually, the volatility of short-term
nominal interest rates. Chadha and Nolan argue that the higher interest rate volatility ould not
be explained by the derease of BoE redibility.
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pat on interest rates volatility rests on unertainty related to eonomi and nan-
ial situation (Banerjee, 1992; Bikhandani et al., 1992; MQueen and Roley, 1993;
Fleming and Remolona, 1997; Veronesi, 1999). Aording to these authors, the
main maroeonomi and monetary news an strongly inuene market operators
behaviour not only during of monetary poliy unertainty but also during eonomi
or/and nanial instability. Thus, without questioning the redibility and trans-
pareny of the BoE, various nanial rises ourring after 1997
14
and the eonomi
situation may have reated unertainty on nanial market whih explains the greater
impat of the BoE's deisions on interest rates volatility. Speially, by aeting neg-
atively the English eonomy and of other industrialized ountries (Lahrèhe-Révil,
2002; Heitz et al., 2004) the Asian risis and the Russian risis reated unertainty.
The unertainty related to the nanial situation results from the dierent nanial
risis and more partiularly the Russian risis and the bursting of the tehnology
and internet bubble in 2002 in USA. These both rises had a generalized eet on a
world. In sum, unertainty about the British eonomi ativity ombined with nan-
ial unertainty ould explain the greater eet of news on interest rate volatility.
7 Conlusion
This paper investigates the impat of the Bank of England independene on nanial
market reation to news related to the monetary poliy. Speially, it analyzes the
eets of this new redibility measure on the reation of British Treasury rate and
Government bond rate level and volatility to news related to the Bank of England
poliy. These news orrespond to the BoE target variables news and to unexpeted
part of the poliy rate hanges. It also analyzes how a greater redibility inuenes
the preditability of the BoE rate hanges. The results obtained suggest that sine
May 1997, period where the BoE was granted operational independene, market par-
tiipants have been able to antiipate better the deisions of the British monetary
authorities. Contrary to the theoretial waiting of a greater redibility eets, our
results show that the eets of the announements of the BoE target variables news
and poliy rate deisions diusion on interest rate volatility inrease after 1997. A
priori, these results an suggest a derease of the BoE transpareny and/or redibil-
14
For example the Asian risis (July 1997), the Russian risis (August 1998), the Brazilian risis
(January 1999) and the Argentina risis (November 2001).
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ity degree after 1997. However, the loser evolution of the realized ination around
the target xed by the BoE and the evolution of the transpareny and redibility
index suggest that the BoE transpareny and redibility degree inrease sine 1997
ompare to the period prior to 1997. Giving these observations and the results ob-
tained by Banerjee (1992), Bikhandani et al. (1992), MQueen and Roley (1993),
Fleming and Remolona (1997) and Veronesi (1999), the greater impat of maroeo-
nomi and monetary news announements on interest rates volatility an be explain
by the unertainty related to the nanial risis (the Asian risis (July 1997), the
Russian risis (August 1998) and the bursting of the tehnology and internet bub-
ble in 2002 in USA). In sum, the eet of the maroeonomi and monetary news on
market volatility depends on monetary poliy unertainty as well as eonomi and/or
nanial unertainty.
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Table 3: Estimation results (interest rate mean)
94-97 97-03
3-month 6-month 12-month 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year 3-month 6-month 12-month 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year
a -0.0043
∗
-0.0014 0.0027 -0.0037 -0.0024 -0.0054
∗
0.0008 -0.003
∗∗
-0.0042 0.0004 0.0005 0.0013 0.0014 0.0011
(−2.07) (−1.35) (1.41) (−1.27) (−0.82) (−2.00) (0.23) (−1.88) (−1.48) (0.25) (0.28) (0.67) (0.71) (0.55)
b -0.0613 -0.0226 0.0578 0.1075
∗
0.0627
∗∗
0.0330 -0.0123 -0.1570
∗
-0.0033 0.1039
∗
0.0905
∗
0.0561
∗
0.0369 0.0238
(−0.91) (−0.45) (1.10) (3.04) (1.86) (1.02) (−0.31) (−3.62) (−0.05) (3.73) (3.25) (2.17) (1.47) (0.97)
c 0.0918 0.1462 0.0842 0.2060∗ 0.1240∗ 0.0451 -0.0186 0.5319∗ 0.4942∗ 0.4478∗ 0.2125∗ 0.1042 0.0298 -0.0336
(0.73) (1.33) (0.68) (2.50) (2.07) (0.81) (−0.29) (7.65) (6.22) (8.72) (2.66) (1.48) (0.43) (−0.50)
dcho 0.0000
∗
0.0000
∗
0.0000
∗
0.0000
∗
0.0000
∗
0.0000
∗
0.0000
∗
0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(−2.93) (−3.70) (−3.19) (−3.14) (−2.91) (−2.70) (−2.54) (1.59) (1.34) (0.78) (0.61) (0.09) (0.01) (0.12)
dipc -0.0192 0.076
∗∗
-0.0116 0.118
∗∗
0.0229 0.0262 0.0997
∗
0.0313
∗
0.0713
∗
0.0907
∗
0.0875 0.0612 0.0506 0.0291
(−0.44) (1.78) (−0.52) (1.86) (0.53) (0.75) (2.22) (2.00) (3.50) (8.81) (1.38) (1.11) (1.01) (0.73)
dppii 0.0016 0.0042 0.0142 0.0276
∗
0.0308
∗
0.0250
∗
0.0229
∗
0.0009 -0.0004 0.007
∗∗
0.0051 0.0055 0.0050 0.0020
(0.19) (0.61) (0.84) (2.93) (3.68) (2.97) (2.29) (0.27) (−0.07) (1.89) (0.76) (0.83) (0.77) (0.30)
dppio 0.0151 0.0736
∗
0.0395 0.0153 -0.0065 0.0008 0.0097 -0.0090 -0.032
∗∗
-0.0097 -0.0048 -0.0007 -0.0005 -0.0079
(0.48) (3.47) (1.07) (0.41) (−0.18) (0.02) (0.26) (−0.32) (−1.96) (−0.81) (−0.20) (−0.03) (−0.03) (−0.47)
dvd 0.0190
∗
0.0218
∗
0.0354
∗
0.0629
∗
0.0488
∗
0.0313
∗∗
0.0226 0.0139
∗
0.0131 0.0286
∗
0.0250
∗
0.014
∗∗
0.0095 0.0036
(2.25) (2.10) (2.11) (3.80) (2.97) (1.80) (1.02) (2.25) (1.07) (4.11) (3.01) (1.69) (1.13) (0.39)
dprod 0.0008 0.0146 0.0131 0.023
∗∗
0.0125 0.0037 0.0061 0.0032 0.016
∗∗
0.0180
∗
0.0262
∗
0.0238
∗
0.0220
∗
0.0187
∗
(0.22) (1.13) (0.56) (1.67) (0.91) (0.28) (0.33) (1.44) (1.74) (2.26) (3.60) (3.71) (3.41) (2.94)
dm0 0.0039 0.0061 -0.0044 0.0083 0.0178 0.0307
∗
0.037
∗∗
0.0124
∗
0.0053 -0.0062 -0.0171
∗
-0.016
∗∗
-0.0104 -0.0078
(0.71) (1.53) (−0.61) (0.54) (1.28) (2.16) (1.70) (4.13) (0.37) (−0.78) (−2.23) (−1.88) (−1.08) (−0.78)
dm4 0.0276
∗
0.0221
∗
0.022
∗∗
0.0244 0.0240 0.0114 0.0088 -0.0050 -0.0297
∗
-0.0009 0.012
∗∗
0.0098 0.0065 0.0050
(2.39) (2.31) (1.95) (1.61) (1.51) (0.83) (0.45) (−0.57) (−2.83) (−0.08) (1.84) (1.08) (0.81) (0.72)
emon 0.0086
∗
0.0075
∗
0.0011 0.0104
∗
0.0078 0.0118
∗
0.0032 0.0004 0.006
∗∗
-0.0023 -0.0028 -0.0042 -0.0044 -0.0037
(2.25) (2.26) (0.36) (1.97) (1.50) (2.28) (0.51) (0.32) (1.65) (−1.19) (−0.94) (−1.39) (−1.48) (−1.21)
ewen 0.006
∗∗
-0.0018 -0.0062 -0.0011 -0.0054 -0.0004 -0.0022 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0018 -0.0041 -0.005
∗∗
-0.006
∗∗
-0.0050
(1.99) (−0.56) (−1.59) (−0.18) (−0.93) (−0.07) (−0.33) (0.49) (−0.04) (−0.72) (−1.20) (−1.68) (−1.87) (−1.49)
efri 0.0028 0.005
∗∗
-0.0060 0.0078 0.0045 0.0056 0.0044 -0.0008 0.0044 -0.0053 -0.006
∗∗
-0.0077
∗
-0.0077
∗
-0.007
∗∗
(1.04) (1.71) (−1.42) (1.37) (0.76) (0.94) (0.65) (−0.37) (1.00) (−1.38) (−1.88) (−2.22) (−2.15) (−1.85)
Notes: The values in (.) are the t-statistis proposed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992)?.
* and ** indiate that the orresponding oeient is statistially signiant at the 5% and 10 % level, respetively.
∆Rt = a + b∆Rt−1 + c∆r
∗
t +
∑K
k=1 dkD
a
k,t +
∑3
j=1 ejJSt + ǫt
UE: unemployment; CPI: onsumer prie index; PPI: produer prie index, PROD: prodution index; RET: retail sales; M4: aggregate M4
1
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Table 4: Estimation results (interest rate volatility)
94-97 97-03
3-month 6-month 12-month 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year 3-month 6-month 12-month 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year
w 0.0010
∗
0.0000 0.0004
∗
0.0003 0.0001 0.0001 0.0044
∗
0.0012
∗
0.0032
∗
0.0003
∗
0.0006
∗
0.0006
∗
0.0007
∗
0.0007
∗
(5.09) (0.60) (2.56) (0.68) (0.37) (−0.25) (5.42) (11.58) (13.88) (25.25) (2.76) (3.37) (3.96) (3.44)
α 0.2053∗ 0.3588∗ 0.2079∗ 0.0506∗ 0.0440∗ 0.0393∗ 0.1467∗ 0.1485∗ 0.3420∗ 0.0719∗ 0.0492∗ 0.0291∗ 0.0301∗ 0.0305∗
(2.19) (2.84) (3.23) (3.43) (2.99) (3.42) (3.06) (3.49) (10.51) (9.49) (3.22) (3.05) (3.48) (3.21)
β 0.5667∗ 0.5388∗ 0.6464∗ 0.9313∗ 0.9440∗ 0.9512∗ 0.5929∗ 0.5941∗ 0.5581∗ 0.6436∗ 0.8906∗ 0.9494∗ 0.9446∗ 0.9372∗
(4.81) (6.25) (10.07) (40.04) (46.73) (57.56) (4.91) (8.09) (48.47) (23.70) (26.56) (63.39) (73.62) (69.57)
γ 0.0011 0.0040 0.00256 0.0012 0.0018∗ 0.0017∗ 0.00010 0.0001 0.0136∗ 0.0033∗ 0.0009∗ 0.0008∗ 0.0007∗ 0.0007∗
(0.29) (0.67) (0.36) (1.19) (2.11) (1.97) (0.04) (0.12) (9.57) (4.21) (2.10) (2.21) (2.01) (1.94)
θcho -0.001
∗∗
-0.0005 0.00030 0.0001 0.0001 -0.0004 -0.0020 0.0000 0.0002
∗∗
0.0008
∗
-0.001
∗
-0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0004
(−1.73) (−1.41) (0.60) (0.16) (0.08) (−0.68) (−1.42) (−0.03) (1.72) (3.75) (−1.74) (−0.72) (−0.66) (−1.01)
θipc 0.0001 0.0006 -0.0010
∗
-0.0001 -0.0012
∗
-0.001
∗∗
-0.0015 -0.0014
∗
-0.0016
∗
0.0006
∗
0.0009
∗
0.0003 0.0001 0.0001
(0.27) (1.16) (−2.61) (−0.25) (−2.27) (−1.80) (−1.36) (−4.39) (−7.26) (4.86) (2.51) (0.73) (0.42) (0.38)
θppii 0.0004 -0.0076
∗
0.0002 -0.0022 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0013 0.0000 0.0001 0.0026 0.0009 0.0007 0.001
∗∗
0.0009
∗
(0.19) (−4.55) (0.12) (−1.62) (−0.27) (0.00) (−0.55) (0.00) (0.01) (0.77) (0.99) (1.26) (1.95) (2.35)
θppio 0.0007 0.0074
∗
0.002551 0.0017 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0013 0.0000 -0.0012 -0.0029 -0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0010
∗
-0.0010
∗
(0.59) (4.00) (1.46) (1.37) (0.35) (0.29) (−0.57) (0.00) (−0.08) (−0.87) (−1.03) (−1.18) (−2.04) (−2.41)
θvd 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0011 -0.0019
∗
-0.0010 -0.0009 -0.0020
∗
-0.0014
∗
-0.0002
∗∗
-0.0001 -0.0009
∗
-0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002
(0.08) (−0.45) (1.58) (−2.47) (−1.43) (−1.36) (−2.38) (−8.14) (−1.68) (−0.77) (−2.34) (−1.10) (−1.01) (−0.71)
θprod -0.0005
∗
0.0005 0.001 -0.0012
∗∗
-0.0015
∗
-0.0016
∗
-0.0021
∗
-0.0001 0.0005 0.0010
∗
-0.0008
∗
-0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0003
(−6.49) (0.93) (1.40) (−1.95) (−2.28) (−3.13) (−2.29) (−0.42) (1.63) (6.27) (−2.02) (−1.29) (−0.97) (−1.23)
θm0 -0.0011
∗
-0.0002 0.0012
∗
-0.0003 -0.001
∗∗
-0.001
∗∗
-0.0048
∗
-0.0014
∗
-0.0010
∗
0.0003
∗
0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003
(−6.80) (−0.74) (2.13) (−0.39) (−1.65) (−1.71) (−5.93) (−7.10) (−8.88) (4.29) (0.74) (−0.56) (−0.89) (−0.67)
λlu 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0011
∗
0.0000 -0.001
∗∗
-0.001
∗∗
-0.0026
∗
-0.0009 -0.0029
∗
-0.0015
∗
-0.0009
∗
-0.0013
∗
-0.0016
∗
-0.0016
∗
(0.40) (1.03) (−3.76) (−0.07) (−1.73) (−1.69) (−2.68) (−1.07) (−9.83) (−17.28) (−2.20) (−3.48) (−4.18) (−3.99)
λme -0.0010
∗
0.0011
∗
-0.00001 0.0022
∗
0.002
∗∗
0.0022
∗
-0.0015 -0.0002 -0.0042
∗
0.0001
∗∗
-0.0002 -0.0006 -0.001
∗∗
-0.0005
(−3.56) (3.05) (−0.24) (2.49) (1.86) (2.85) (−1.10) (−0.77) (−10.97) (1.81) (−0.35) (−1.53) (−1.92) (−1.19)
λve -0.0014
∗
0.0001 0.0002 0.0004 0.0003 0.0006 -0.0032
∗
0.0000 -0.0036
∗
0.0014
∗
-0.0011
∗
-0.0008
∗
-0.0008
∗
-0.001
∗∗
(−5.19) (0.53) (0.39) (0.50) (0.35) (0.81) (−3.17) (−0.02) (−13.42) (9.17) (−2.53) (−2.09) (−2.04) (−1.80)
Notes: The values in (.) are the t-statistis proposed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992)?.
* and ** indiate that the orresponding oeient is statistially signiant at the 5% and 10 % level, respetively.
UE: unemployment; CPI: onsumer prie index; PPI: produer prie index, PROD: prodution index; RET: retail sales; M4: aggregate M4
2
0
Table 5: Wald test
94-97 97-03
3-month 6-month 12-month 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year 3-month 6-month 12-month 3-year 5-year 7-year 10-year
α+ β 0.7720 0.8976 0.8543 0.9819 0.9880 0.9905 0.7396 0.7427 0.9001 0.7155 0.9398 0.9785 0.9747 0.9677
Wald test
α +
β = 1
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
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Central bank redibility index
Cukierman and Meltzer (1986) authors dene monetary poliy redibility as "the
absolute value of the dierene between the poliymaker's plans and the publi's
beliefs about those plans". In this approah, the redibility index an be expressed
as:
Cre = 1 if E(π) < πt,
Cre = 1−
E(π)− πt
0.2− πt
if πt < E(π) < 20%,
Cre = 0 if E(π) > 20%.
The more the expeted ination (E(π)) diverges from the level of the target ination
(πt), the less redible the entral bank is (Cre→ 0). In the same vein, if the expeted
ination is smaller than or lose to the target level of ination, then the redibility
of the entral bank attains its maximum value (Cre→ 1).
Some authors, as Cehetti and Krause (2002), while using this approah, sup-
posed the same level for the ination target for all the ountries they retained in
their empirial analysis. In addition, they also assume that the expeted ination
used in order to onstrut the redibility index is based on the realized ination of
the previous period. Contrary to these authors, we x the same ination target
for the industrialized ountries and the same target for the emerging ountries. For
the industrialized ountries, we suppose that the ination target is 2.125
15
, whih
orresponds to the average of the target x by some entral bank of industrialized
ountries pratiing ination target. As for the emerging ountries, we suppose that
the ination target is equal to 3.25
16
. Furthermore, the expeted ination is obtained
using data from Datastream.
15
2.125 orresponds to the average value of the ination target level xed by industrial ountries,
as United Kingdom and Australia, during 90s.
16
3.25 orrespond to the average value of the ination target level xed by emerging ountries, as
Brazil and Mexio, during 90s.
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Table 6: Test of unit root
ADF ZandA SEO
C B A C B A Model 2 Model 1 Model 0
ρ̂ β̂ ρ̂ µ̂ ρ̂
3 month -1.176 -0.000
∗
0.483 -0.003
∗
-0.912
∗
-2.576
∗
-2.083
∗
-2.572
∗
-1.650
∗
-0.521
∗
-1.433
∗
(−2.931) (−0.65) [03/97] [07/97] [09/96]
[0.58℄ [0.58℄ [0.58℄
6 month -1.589 -0.000
∗
0.116 -0.002
∗
-0.770
∗
-2.711
∗
-2.236
∗
-2.982
∗
-1.607
∗
-1.010
∗
-0.577
∗
(−2.89) (−0.25) [03/97] [08/97] [09/96]
[0.49℄ [0.50℄ [0.51℄
12 month -2.075 -0.000
∗
0.197 -0.002
∗
-0.701
∗
-2.838
∗
-2.602
∗
-3.374
∗
-1.723
∗
-0.698
∗
-1.476
∗
(−3.45) (−0.32) [10/96] [01/00] [09/96]
[0.62℄ [0.62℄ [0.59℄
3 year -3.867 -0.000
∗
-0.418 0.002
∗
-0.695
∗
-4.818
∗
-4.019
∗
-4.549
∗
-0.530
∗
0.197
∗
-1.717
∗
(−4.29) (0.29) [07/99] [10/01] [06/99]
[0.58℄ [0.59℄ [0.57℄
5 year -3.817 -0.000
∗
-0.439 0.002
∗
-0.741
∗
-4.908
∗
-4.139
∗
-4.709
∗
-0.496
∗
0.152
∗
-1.959
∗
(−4.14) (0.30) [06/99] [10/98] [06/99]
[0.62℄ [0.62℄ [0.62℄
7 year -3.803 -0.000
∗
-0.410 0.001
∗
-0.835
∗
-5.018
∗
-4.637
∗
-5.098
∗
-0.160
∗
-0.14
∗
-2.09
∗
(−4.04) (0.24) [05/99] [10/98] [06/99]
[0.63℄ [0.63℄ [0.64℄
10 year -3.636 -0.000
∗
-0.502 0.002
∗
-0.794
∗
-5.007
∗
-4.634
∗
-5.147
∗
-0.856
∗
-0.392
∗
-1.85
∗
(−3.81) (0.33) [11/97] [10/98] [04/97]
[0.65℄ [0.64℄ [0.65℄
* and ** indiate that the orresponding oeient is statistially signiant at the 5% and 10 % level, respetively.
The values [./.℄ in the entral part of the table orrespond to the month and the year of the hange.
The value [.℄ in the right hand of the table orresponds to the value of ρ.
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Table 7: Statistial properties of daily U.K. interest rate variations
3 month 6 month 12 month 3 year 5 year 7 year 10 year
Lyung-Box (LB)
test on the squared
residuals
LBQ2(1) 80.00
∗
460.69
∗
18.53
∗
29.75
∗
27.71
∗
25.75
∗
33.90
∗
LBQ2(5) 89.00
∗
497.68
∗
21.50
∗
78.61
∗
171.79
∗
187.98
∗
203.69
∗
LBQ2(10) 92.01
∗
506.40
∗
21.73
∗
151.00
∗
297.53
∗
343.10
∗
371.06
∗
Box-Piere (BP)
test on the squared
residuals
BP
ǫ2
(1) 79.87∗ 459.92∗ 18.50∗ 29.70∗ 27.66∗ 25.71∗ 33.85∗
BP
ǫ2
(5) 88.84∗ 496.83∗ 21.46∗ 78.42∗ 171.34∗ 187.48∗ 203.17∗
BP
ǫ2
(10) 91.84∗ 505.51∗ 21.69∗ 150.47∗ 296.49∗ 341.89∗ 369.79∗
LM test for ARCH
eet (Engle
(1982))
LM − ARCH(1) 79.87∗ 459.92∗ 18.50∗ 29.70∗ 27.67∗ 25.72∗ 33.86∗
LM − ARCH(5) 82.09∗ 475.61∗ 20.42∗ 60.62∗ 122.15∗ 133.22∗ 136.90∗
LM − ARCH(10) 84.52∗ 480.94∗ 20.63∗ 93.29∗ 159.97∗ 172.05∗ 179.59∗
* and ** indiate that the orresponding oeient is statistially signiant at the 5% and 10 % level, respetively.
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Table 8: Statistial properties of innovations (ǫ1)
3 month 6 month 12 month 3 year 5 year 7 year 10 year
Lyung-Box (LB)
test on the squared
residuals
LB(1) 1.506
∗
8.803
∗
0.418
∗
0.111
∗
0.046
∗
0.008
∗
0.001
∗
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
LB(5) 12.572
∗
67.316
∗
9.708
∗
2.946 2.488 1.499 1.731
(0.01) (1.60E−14) (0.02) (0.40) (0.48) (0.68) (0.63)
LB(10) 13.987
∗∗
119.209
∗
21.434
∗
11.844 10.598 6.964 10.786
(0.08) (4.83E−22) (0.01) (0.16) (0.23) (0.54) (0.21)
LM test for ARCH
eet (Engle
(1982))
LM-ARCH(1) 74.986
∗
435.386
∗
22.412
∗
34.940
∗
30.274
∗
29.560
∗
35.363
∗
(4.74E−18) (1.09E−96) (2.20E−6) (3.40E−9) (3.75E−8) (5.42E−8) (0.00)
LM-ARCH(5) 77.853
∗
450.439
∗
24.183
∗
66.330
∗
127.051
∗
138.614
∗
140.945
∗
(2.36E−15) (3.95E−95) (0.00) (5.94E−13) (1.00E−25) (3.53E−28) (0.00)
LM-ARCH(10) 80.365
∗
456.763
∗
24.549
∗
98.848
∗
163.672
∗
175.653
∗
183.233
∗
(4.26E−13) (7.54E−92) (0.01) (9.26E−17) (5.65E−30) (1.87E−32) (0.00)
Engle and Ng
(1993) sign and size
bias statisti
Sign Bias test 0.000 0.746 0.812 2.502
∗
0.826 0.000 0.327
Pos. size Bias test 60.315
∗
246.329
∗
1.516 21.447
∗
7.596
∗
12.504
∗
12.815
∗
Neg. size Bias test 11.691
∗
18.780
∗
32.328
∗
1.498 6.707
∗
2.640
∗
5.398
∗
Join test Engle and
Ng
89.171
∗
292.023
∗
43.574
∗
30.578
∗
23.671
∗
23.135
∗
27.995
∗
1 ǫ orrespond to the innovation series in the model Eq. 1.
*, ** indiate signiane at the 5% and 10% levels.
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